Many theists reject materialism, believing that only dualism is compatible with theism. Very few seem to realize that Christianity has been the primary defender of a material-based soul for 2,000 years. The Apostle’s Creed and the Nicene Creed, which are the definitive statements of faith for virtually all of the world’s Christians, profess belief in resurrection of the body.
Very early in Christian history, some gnostics began to claim that the spiritual is pure, while the physical is corrupt. They asserted that heaven is the place where people’s souls escape their bodies. This was condemned as heresy. Christians worship a God who was crucified and rose again — with a physical body, and scars that His disciples could touch. This is a central belief of Christianity. The Christian concept of bodily resurrection does not involve reanimation of corrupted cadavers, but instead involves people being given new bodies (or “bodies made new”).
Dualism asserts that the universe is made of two different types of substance: physical, which follows the laws of physics, and “immaterial” or “spirit”, which does not. I cannot say whether or not dualism is true. But Christianity does not say that the soul’s destiny is immaterial. We should remember this when discussing dualism vs. materialism.
“Very early in Christian history, some gnostics began to claim that the spiritual is pure, while the physical is corrupt. They asserted that heaven is the place where people’s souls escape their bodies. This was condemned as heresy.” ~ joshua
Quite right. But this does not imply that dualism is false, which is what I understood you to assert at CommonSenseAtheism. But here you state you “cannot say whether or not dualism is true”. I’m confused – could you expand on your view?
Hi Thomas,
I haven’t found anything which convincingly falsifies dualism, so I can’t reject it. But I don’t find the attempted falsifications of materialism to be convincing, either. I think matters are still very inconclusive.
More importantly, I don’t think that dualism is taught in the scriptures, and I’m no longer convinced that materialism is incompatible with theism. So many times, it seems like the materialists just state what the Bible already said, and add on a completely arbitrary clause of, “therefore there is no God!” And the theists get baited by that arbitrary clause into rejecting the part that comes before. Soon we’re going to be baited into rejecting every major Christian doctrine just to avoid agreeing with materialists about anything.
(At least, that’s the way I’m looking at it right now. Maybe I’ll swing back toward dualism after I read/think about it more)
“More importantly, I don’t think that dualism is taught in the scriptures, and I’m no longer convinced that materialism is incompatible with theism.” ~joshua
Interesting. So what are your thoughts regarding the following:
1. The OT concept of Sheol
2. Jesus’ remarks in Luke 23:43
3. Paul’s desire recorded in Philippians 1:23
Finally, you don’t take God to be material, right? So if you agree with that, there’s at least one instance of an immaterial being.
Thanks Thomas,
I take all 3 cases to be talking about the preservation of souls for some future resurrection. As I’ve pointed out before, such a view is not incompatible with materialism. Regarding Luke 23:43, you don’t think that the thief was actually feasting with Christ in heaven within 24 hours of that statement, right?
As far as God’s materiality goes, I think it’s a false binary choice to say that a person must be strongly reducible (like the eliminativists say) or else purely spiritual (as the dualists say). Humans are neither strongly reducible nor purely spiritual, and I don’t see why God would be one or the other, either. We worship a God incarnate, and look forward to a physical heaven.
“I take all 3 cases to be talking about the preservation of souls for some future resurrection. As I’ve pointed out before, such a view is not incompatible with materialism.” ~joshua
But what do you understand to be the soul that is preserved? In what sense is it preserved if we are essentially material?
“Regarding Luke 23:43, you don’t think that the thief was actually feasting with Christ in heaven within 24 hours of that statement, right?”
That’s right, I don’t. But the important point is that the thief still existed after death. I don’t know how to understand this teaching outside of dualism. You think this is possibly compatible with materialism – could you give a brief sketch of this?
“As far as God’s materiality goes, I think it’s a false binary choice to say that a person must be strongly reducible (like the eliminativists say) or else purely spiritual (as the dualists say).” ~joshua
Well, dualists wouldn’t say we are purely (by which I think you mean “essentially”) spiritual. I mean, that’s why the term is “dualism”. Personally, I take a human being to be essentially spirit plus matter.
“Humans are neither strongly reducible nor purely spiritual, and I don’t see why God would be one or the other, either.” ~joshua
So on that view, either God wasn’t fully God without creation, or some matter has existed for eternity. Would you agree that position leads you to this disjunction?
I think that materialists, of all people, are most committed to a framework that requires immortality of the soul:
http://lowerwisdom.com/2010/06/why-souls-are-immortal/
“Personally, I take a human being to be essentially spirit plus matter.” ~Thomas
So do I. And “spirit” could be something that supervenes on the physical, rather than some mysterious pixie dust that evades the laws of physics.
“So on that view, either God wasn’t fully God without creation, or some matter has existed for eternity. Would you agree that position leads you to this disjunction?” ~Thomas
I would not agree at all. What does it even mean to say “God was”? God is.
Philosophical speculations about things Genesis leaves vague are not adequate grounds for smuggling dualism into Christianity, just as they are not adequate grounds for insisting on YEC.
“Personally, I take a human being to be essentially spirit plus matter.” ~Thomas
“So do I. And ‘spirit’ could be something that supervenes on the physical, rather than some mysterious pixie dust that evades the laws of physics.” ~joshua
I’m not sure what the pixie dust reference is supposed to imply, and I’m not sure if you think there is some kind of problem with evading the laws of physics. Substance dualism (the strongest form of dualism) does not espouse evasion of any physical laws, but is rather thoroughly compatible with them. Could you explain what you mean here? Do you have an argument for supervenience that you find particularly compelling?
“Would you agree that position leads you to this disjunction?” ~Thomas
“I would not agree at all. What does it even mean to say ‘God was’? God is.” ~joshua
But if you take the view that God is not just immaterial being, then it seems to me you are committed either to the idea that matter has existed for eternity, or that God has undergone some kind of substantive transformation upon the creation of matter.
I agree with you, “God is”. He is self-existent. But on your view, this is not possible unless matter has existed from eternity.
“Philosophical speculations about things Genesis leaves vague are not adequate grounds for smuggling dualism into Christianity, just as they are not adequate grounds for insisting on YEC.”
Although I agree with you, I’m not sure I see how this is relevant. I mean, similarly, I could say that said vagueness is inadequate for smuggling materialism into Christianity. Fortunately, substance dualism (SD) is compatible with Genesis, and one doesn’t need to reference Genesis to come up with scriptural support for SD. We can also set aside discussions of YEC, it isn’t relevant to our purposes here.
Hi Thomas,
Can you explain how substance dualism differs substantively from supervenience naturalism? You can provide a good reference if you want; I read fast.
The main differences I have seen are related to the was/is distinction, which is why I brought it up.
I also would be interested to see scriptural support for SD (as distinct from supervenience naturalism). In my mind, the scriptural support for YEC is a whole lot stronger. I agree that we can leave YEC out of it, but I’m impatient with arguments about angels on heads of pins and so on.
joshua,
A good starting point for a current defense of substance dualism is Moreland and Rae’s “Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics”. The first half of the book is Moreland’s explication of Aquinas’ position, and most relevant to our discussion here.
The authors argue with scriptural support for SD, and contrast SD with supervenience. The important differences I see between the latter and SD is in regard to causation, endurance through time, and treatment of the soul as a property-thing.
See you ’round. Best of luck sparring it up at Common Sense Atheism!
Thomas, do you have anything more to the point, in essay form, available online? I’ve read Aquinas, as well as quite a bit on materialism versus dualism (most recently “Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian Approach” by E.J. Lowe in “The Waning of Materialism”). So forgive me if I find “read this random book” to be a little bit dismissive. If I were confident that the book would add anything new, I’d happily read it (it’s available on Kindle, at least).
Hm, after a brief search I couldn’t find anything that would fairly capture the book, sorry. I will say, though, that it’s not some “random book” – it expands the position I’m defending here. Moreover, it contains specifically what you asked for, which is scriptural support for SD.
Hi Thomas,
I found the book on Google books and have read through chapters 2 and 3 (about 100 pages). It looks like standard substance dualism, and when they say a soul is a “property-thing”, I don’t know how that is really different from supervenience naturalism.
I didn’t see anything about scriptural backing. Do you have a page number or chapter?
I researched, and it looks as if Moreland is a Thomist SD rather than Cartesian SD. Is this link accurate to what you were thinking about? If so, I’m not really encouraged about the level of “scriptural support”. As you know, Aquinas was often highly speculative, and did indeed argue about how many angels could fit on the head of a pin. Not that Thomism is wrong, but I don’t see clearcut case for dualism from scripture.
(Those are hyperlinks in the above comment, BTW. Sorry the CSS is not very good, so the link highlight is *very* subtle)
Hi joshua,
Glad you found it on google books! I long for the days of being able to read that much in a sitting.
“It looks like standard substance dualism, and when they say a soul is a “property-thing”, I don’t know how that is really different from supervenience naturalism.”
Really? Supervenience espouses the idea that properties emerge only in when certain physical states obtain. Substance dualism espouses an immaterial simple substance as part of a human being. To me this seems like a huge metaphysical gap.
“Is this link accurate to what you were thinking about? If so, I’m not really encouraged about the level of ‘scriptural support’.”
Since that link didn’t mention a single verse, I’m not surprised at your discouragement. For Moreland’s scriptural support, try pages 24 through 40 of the book.
“I researched, and it looks as if Moreland is a Thomist SD rather than Cartesian SD.”
Correct.
OK, Google Books doesn’t have those pages, so I was quite annoyed at being forced to buy the Kindle version of the book (for $15!!!). I’m glad I did, though; that section is quite good.
Now, I am still not convinced that scriptures imply dualism. All he has proven is that scriptures reject eliminativism (and that quite strongly). He vaguely describes something that sounds almost like supervenience naturalism, but calls it “functionalism”, and glancingly suggests that it has “problems”. To my mind, the “soul” described in any of those verses, including “God’s”, could easily be the “program” of supervenience.
Supervenience espouses the idea that properties emerge only in when certain physical states obtain. Substance dualism espouses an immaterial simple substance as part of a human being.
This seems like a semantic quibble to me. We can use the same word games to act like computer programs must “emerge” only when “physical states obtain”; or to claim that a running computer system is not physical, since the “program” is an immaterial simple substance of the system. Both stances are technically correct, and acting as if there is a conflict is not helpful, IMO.
I know that supervenience naturalists will talk about the “primacy of the physical”, and I suppose this is where people get baited into arguing. But I’m still convinced it’s a stupid semantic debate.